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Abstract
We study the complexity of computing the Shapley value in games
with externalities. We focus on two representations based on marginal
contribution nets (embedded MC-nets and weighted MC-nets). Our re-
sults show that while weighted MC-nets are more concise than embedded
MC-nets, they have slightly worse computational properties when it comes
to computing the Shapley value.
1 Introduction
Coalitional games are a standard model of cooperation in multi-agent sys-
tems (Chalkiadakis et al., 2011). In the classic form the profit of a coalition is
assumed to be independent of the coalitions formed by the other players. How-
ever, this simplifying assumption does not hold in many settings. For example,
if agents in a system have conflicted goals or limited resources, then coalitions
naturally affect each other (Dunne, 2005). There are also examples of external-
ities in economics, in oligopolistic markets in particular, where cooperation of
some companies affect the profits of the competitors (Yi, 2003). That is why, in
the last decade coalitional games with externalities have gain attention both in
economic (Ko´czy, 2018; Abe & Funaki, 2017) and AI literature (Rahwan et al.,
2012; Michalak et al., 2010).
Externalities present new challenges both conceptual and computational.
On the conceptual side, it is unclear how to extend most solution concepts to
games with externalities. In particular, there are several non-equivalent well-
established methods of extending the Shapley value to games with externalities
proposed by De Clippel & Serrano (2008) (EF-value), McQuillin (2009) (MQ-
value), Hu & Yang (2010) (HY-value), Feldman (1996) (SS-value) and Myerson
(1977b) (MY-value). On the computational side, the existence of externalities
significantly increases the size of the game itself.
To cope with the extensive space requirement of games with externalities,
three different representations were proposed in the literature. The first two,
called embedded MC-nets (Michalak et al., 2010) and weighted MC-nets (Michalak et al.,
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Embedded MC-nets Weighted MC-nets
MQ-value in P (∗) in P (Th.6)
EF-value in P (Th.8) #P-complete (Th.9)
HY-value #P-complete (Th.10) #P-complete (Th.10)
SS-value #P-complete (Th.13) #P-complete (Th.13)
MY-value #P-complete (Th.14) #P-complete (Th.14)
Table 1: Summary of complexity results for computing extended Shapley value
in games represented as embedded and weighted MC-nets. (∗) Proved by
Michalak et al. (2010).
2010), are extensions of the well-known logic-based representation: marginal
contribution nets (Ieong & Shoham, 2005). For the former representation, the
authors proved that one extension of the Shapley value can be computed in poly-
nomial time. For the latter one, only partial results have been proposed for three
extensions. More recently, Skibski et al. (2015) proposed a new representation,
partition decision trees, and proved that all five extensions of the Shapley value
listed above can be computed in polynomial time under this representation.
In this paper, we fill the gap in the literature by determining what is the
complexity of computing all the five extensions of the Shapley value in games
represented as embedded and weighted MC-nets. Specifically, we show that only
two out of five extensions can be computed in polynomial time for embedded
MC-nets and only one can be computed in polynomial time for weighted MC-
nets (unless P = NP). For all other values we show that computation is #P-
complete (see Table 1).
Interestingly, our results are strongly based on graph theory techniques.
Specifically, we show that every embedded/weighted MC-nets rule can be rep-
resented as (one or more) graphs and that each extended Shapley value can be
expressed as the weighted sum over all proper vertex coloring in these graphs.
Building upon these general results, for each value we analyze the resulting
weighted sum. That is, we show that MQ-value is a weighted sum over 2-
colorings and EF-value—over independent sets in a part of the graph. In turn,
SS-value under some assumptions is proved to be equal to the number of match-
ings in a bipartite graph.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we introduce basic notation and definitions.
2.1 Coalitional games with externalities
Let N = {1, . . . , n} be a set of n players, which will be fixed throughout the
paper. A coalition is any nonempty subset of N . The set of all possible partition
of N is denoted by P and the set of all embedded coalitions, i.e., coalitions in
partitions, by EC: EC = {(S, P ) : P ∈ P , S ∈ P}.
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In this paper, by game we mean a coalitional game with externalities in
a partition function form: formally, for a fixed set of players, a game, is a
function that assigns a real value to every embedded coalition: g : EC → R.
We say that a game has no externalities if the value of every coalition does not
depend on the partition, i.e., g(S, P ) = g(S, P ′) for every coalition S ⊆ N and
(S, P ), (S, P ′) ∈ EC.
A value of a player in a game is a real number that represents player’s
importance or expected outcome. The Shapley value (Shapley, 1953) is defined
for games without externalities. Assume g is such a game, i.e., there exists
gˆ : 2N → R such that g(S, P ) = gˆ(S) for every (S, P ) ∈ EC and gˆ(∅) = 0. Now,
the Shapley value is defined as follows:
SVi(gˆ) =
∑
S⊆N
ζiS · gˆ(S),
where:
ζiS =
{
(|S|−1)!(n−|S|)!
n! if i ∈ S,
−|S|!(n−|S|−1)!
n! otherwise.
Note that |ζiS | is the probability that in a random permutation players from
S \ {i} appear before i and N \ (S ∪ {i})—after.
In this paper, we focus on five extensions of the Shapley value to games with
externalities (see (Ko´czy, 2018) for a recent overview). In their definitions, we
use Iverson brackets: [ϕ] = 1 if statement ϕ is true, and [ϕ] = 0, otherwise.
Definition 1. Extended Shapley values are defined as:
ESVi(g) =
∑
(S,P )∈EC
ωi(S, P ) · g(S, P ) (1)
for some weights ω : EC ×N → R:
McQuillin value (MQ-value) (McQuillin, 2009):
ωi(S, P ) = ζ
i
S · [|P | ≤ 2].
Externality-free value (EF-value) (Pham Do & Norde, 2007; De Clippel & Serrano,
2008):
ωi(S, P ) = ζ
i
S · [|P | − 1 = n− |S|].
Hu-Yang value (HY-value) (Hu & Yang, 2010):
ωi(S, P ) = ζ
i
S ·θ(S, P )/|P|, where θ(S, P ) = |{P
′ ∈ P : {T \S : T ∈ P ′} =
P \ {S}}|.
Stochastic Shapley value (SS-value) (Feldman, 1996; Macho-Stadler et al.,
2007; Skibski et al., 2018):
ωi(S, P ) = ζ
i
S · (
∏
T∈P\{S}(|T | − 1)!)/(n− |S|)!.
Myerson value (MY-value) (Myerson, 1977b):
ωi(S, P ) = (−1)
|P |((
∑
T∈P\{S},i6∈T
(|P |−2)!
(n−|T |) )−
(|P |−1)!
n
).
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[4] [3,1] [2,2] [2,1,1] [1,1,1,1] ×
MQ 1 0 0 0 0 1/30
EF 0 0 0 0 1 1/30
HY 5 10 10 17 26 1/6090
SS 6 2 1 1 1 1/720
MY 10 -6 -5 9 -24 1/30
Table 2: Weights ωi(S, P ) from Definition 1 for different extended Shapley
value with |N | = 6, |S| = 2 and i ∈ S. Columns are labeled with the integer
partitions corresponding to sizes of coalitions in P \ {S}. For each value, the
last column contains a common multiplier (e.g., for HY-value and P \ {S} of
the form {{j, k}, {l}, {m}} it holds wi(S, P ) = 17/6090).
XY-value for player i in game g will be denoted by XYi(g).
Let us provide intuition behind these definitions. All values except for MY-
value can be interpreted as a composition of two functions: first function maps a
game with externalities to a game without externalities and the second function
applies the original Shapley value. In the case of MQ-value and EF-value,
the mapping is obtained simply by taking a value of each coalition from one
specific partition. In turn, HY-value and SS-value for every coalition take a
weighted average over all partitions it is in; the difference is HY-value assigns
greater weights to partitions with more coalitions, while SS-value—to partitions
with larger coalitions. Finally, weights of MY-value comes from the inclusion-
exclusion principle caused by a strong carrier property.
See Table 2 for an example. In each row, we marked cells that will be most
important in our complexity results.
2.2 Representations
Game represented as a single rule γ is denoted by gγ and as the set of rules
Γ = {γ1, . . . , γk} by gΓ.
2.2.1 MC-nets (Ieong & Shoham, 2005)
Marginal contribution nets (MC-nets) are a representation for games without
externalities. The game is represented as a set of MC-nets rules of the form:
(α→ c). Here, c ∈ R is the weight of a rule and α is a boolean expression over
N of the form:
(a+1 ∧ · · · ∧ a
+
m ∧ ¬a
−
1 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬a
−
l ), (2)
where a+1 , . . . , a
+
m ∈ N are called positive literals and a
−
1 , . . . , a
−
l ∈ N are called
negative literals. We denote sets of positive and negative literals by ⊕(α) and
⊖(α), respectively, and assume ⊕(α) ∩ ⊖(α) = ∅ and ⊕(α) 6= ∅.1 A coalition S
1Ieong & Shoham (2005) allows rules without positive literals which entails that empty
coalition may have non-zero value. As standard in the literature, we do not allow such
situation.
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satisfies α if it contains all positive literals and does not contain any negative
literal, i.e., ⊕(α) ⊆ S and ⊖(α) ∩ S = ∅. Now, in a game represented as a set
of MC-nets rules the value of coalition S is the sum of weights of all satisfied
rules.
2.2.2 Embedded MC-nets (Michalak et al., 2010)
An embedded MC-nets rule is of the form:
(α1|α2, α3, . . . , αk)→ c,
where c ∈ R is the weight of a rule and α1, . . . , αk are boolean expressions as in
Eq. (2). An embedded coalition (S, P ) satisfies the rule if S satisfies α1 and for
every αi with i > 1 there exists a coalition T ∈ P \{S} that satisfies it. Now, in
a game represented as a set of embedded MC-nets rules the value of embedded
coalition (S, P ) is the sum of weights of all satisfied rules.
2.2.3 Weighted MC-nets (Michalak et al., 2010)
A weighted MC-nets rule is of the form:
(α11 → c
1
1) . . . (α
1
k1
→ c1k1)| . . . |(α
m
1 → c
m
1 ) . . . (α
m
km
→ cmkm),
where (αij → c
i
j) for every i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and j ∈ {1, . . . , ki} is an MC-nets rule.
A partition P satisfies the rule if it can be partitioned into m disjoint subsets
P = P1∪˙ . . . ∪˙Pm such that for every i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and j ∈ {1, . . . , ki} rule
(αij → c
i
j) is satisfies by some coalition from Pi. Now, in a game represented as
a set of weighted MC-nets rules the value of embedded coalition (S, P ) is the
sum of weights of all MC-nets rules (α → c) that S satisfies in all (weighted
MC-nets) rules satisfied by P .
Size: we will assume that the size of a rule is the number of literals plus the
number of weights c.
2.3 Graphs
A graph is a pair (V,E) where V is the set of nodes and E is the set of undirected
edges, i.e., subsets of nodes of size 2.
Two nodes are adjacent if there is an edge connecting them. A clique is a
subset of nodes every two of which are adjacent. An independent set is a subset
of nodes no two of which are adjacent.
A (proper vertex) k-coloring of a graph is a function, f : V → {1, . . . , k},
that assigns colors {1, . . . , k} to nodes in a way that every two adjacent nodes
have different colors, i.e., f(v) 6= f(u) for every {v, u} ∈ E. In other words,
nodes colored with the same color are an independent set. The set of all k-
colorings of a graph G is denoted by Ck(G).
A k-coloring f results in the partition of nodes:
Pf = {f
−1(i) : i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, f−1(i) 6= ∅}.
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1,2v1
3,5v2
4v3
5v4
Figure 1: Graph G = (V,E) and a 4-coloring f with colors: 1 (blue/striped),
2 (yellow/checked), 3 (red/plain), 4 (green/dotted). Note that color 2 is not
used.
A set in Pf that contains node vi is denoted by S
i
f . We say that f uses exactly
p colors if |Pf | = p. Finally, we will denote by θ(f) the number of all k-colorings
that result in the same partition Pf ; note that θ(f) = k(k− 1) · · · (k−|Pf |+1).
We will consider graphs labeled with subsets of players: l : V → 2N . We
will denote the label of node v by l(v) and define l(U) =
⋃
v∈U l(v) for a subset
of nodes U ⊆ V and l(P ) = {l(U) : U ∈ P} for a partition P of nodes V .
Example 1. Figure 1 presents an example graph G = (V,E) and a 4-coloring f .
Coloring f results in the following partition of nodes: Pf = {{v1, v4}, {v2}, {v3}}
(there are θ(f) = 4 · 3 · 2 different 4-colorings that result in this partition). We
have S1f = {v1, v4}.
Note that labels of nodes in G form a partition of the set of players N =
{1, . . . , 6}: {l(v1), l(v2), l(v3), l(v4)} ∈ P . Hence, also l(Pf ) is a partition of N
and (l(S1f ), l(P )) = ({1, 2, 6}, {{1, 2, 6}, {3, 5}, {4}}) is an embedded coalition.
3 Mapping MC-Nets into Graphs
The goal of this section is to show that (1) every embedded and weighted MC-
nets rule can be represented as (one or more) graphs, and (2) game represented
as embedded and weighted MC-nets can be defined based on (proper vertex)
colorings in such graphs.
To this end, we begin by introducing a subclass of weighted MC-nets rules
under the name hybrid rules. The name comes from the fact that hybrid rules,
while they are formally weighted MC-nets rules, have a form almost identical
to embedded MC-nets rules.
Definition 2. (Hybrid rules) A hybrid rule is a weighted MC-nets rule of the
form:
γ = (α1 → c)(α2 → 0) . . . (αk → 0),
with ⊕(αi) ∩ ⊕(αj) = ∅ for i, j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, i 6= j and
⋃k
i=1⊕(αi) = N . We
will call c ∈ R the weight of rule γ.
Note that for every hybrid rule {⊕(α1), . . . ,⊕(αk)} is a partition ofN . Based
on the definition of weighted MC-nets, embedded coalition (S, P ) satisfies hybrid
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rule γ if S satisfies α1 and for every αi with i > 1 there exists a coalition in P
that satisfies it (note that, unlike embedded MC-nets, S may also satisfy αi for
i > 1).
In the following lemma we show that every weighted MC-nets rule can be
expressed using polynomially many hybrid rules.
Lemma 1. Every weighted MC-nets rule of size S is equivalent to a set of
hybrid rules of size poly(n, S).
Proof. All proofs can be found in the appendix.
In turn, in Lemma 2, we show that embedded MC-nets rules are equivalent
to a subset of hybrid rules. We will use a notion of compatibility: we say that
expressions αi, αj are compatible, denoted by comp(αi, αj), if there exists a
coalition that satisfies both of them, i.e., if (⊕(αi)∪⊕(αj))∩(⊖(αi)∪⊖(αj)) = ∅.
Lemma 2. Every embedded MC-nets rule of size S is equivalent to a hybrid
rule of size poly(n, S) satisfying:
∀1<i,j≤k((comp(α1, αi) ∧ comp(α1, αj))→
(comp(αi, αj) ∧ (| ⊕ (αi)| = | ⊕ (αj)| = 1)). (∗)
Moreover, every hybrid rule of size S satisfying (∗) is equivalent to an embedded
MC-nets rule of size poly(n, S).
Lemmas 1 and 2 will be crucial in our complexity analysis as they allow us
to focus on hybrid rules.
So far, we have shown the mapping from weighted MC-nets and embedded
MC-nets rules to hybrid rules. In what follows, we show that every hybrid rule
can be represented as a graph.
Definition 3. (Graph Gγ) For a hybrid rule γ, graph Gγ = (V,E) is a
graph where nodes represent expressions α1, . . . , αk and are labeled with sets
⊕(α1), . . . ,⊕(αk) and edges connect incompatible expressions αi, αj :
• V = {v1, . . . , vk} with l(vi) = ⊕(αi) for every vi ∈ V ;
• E = {{vi, vj} ⊆ V : ¬comp(αi, αj)}.
We note that a similar construction of a graph for the right-hand side part of
the embedded MC-nets was proposed by Skibski et al. (2016).
Example 2. Consider a hybrid rule γ = (α1 → 1)(α2 → 0)(α3 → 0)(α4 → 0)
with:
α1 = (1 ∧ 2 ∧ ¬3), α2 = (3 ∧ 5),
α3 = (4 ∧ ¬1 ∧ ¬3 ∧ ¬6), α4 = (6 ∧ ¬5).
Note that comp(α1, α4) and ¬comp(αi, αj) for other i, j ∈ {1, . . . , 4}, i 6= j.
Graph Gγ is depicted in Figure 1.
Since α4 is the only expression compatible with α1 (other than α1 itself)
and | ⊕ (α4)| = 1, we get that γ satisfies condition (∗). Hence, from Lemma 2
we know that it is equivalent to some embedded MC-nets rule. One such a rule
is: (1 ∧ 2)|(3 ∧ 5 ∧ ¬6)(4 ∧ ¬3 ∧ ¬6)→ 1.
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Definition 3 shows that every hybrid rule can be represented as a graph in
which labels of nodes form a partition of players. The natural question arises:
does every such graph represent some hybrid rule? The answer is “yes”, which
we prove in the following lemma.
Lemma 3. For a graph G = (V,E) with labels l there exists a hybrid rule γ
such that G = Gγ if and only if {l(v) : v ∈ V } is a partition of N .
The next lemma states the necessary and sufficient conditions for the graph
to represent a hybrid rule that satisfies condition (∗).
Lemma 4. For a graph G = (V,E) with labels l there exists a hybrid rule γ
satisfying condition (∗) such that G = Gγ if and only if:
(i) {l(v) : v ∈ V } is a partition of N ;
(ii) {u ∈ V \ {v1} : {v1, u} 6∈ E} (nodes not adjacent to v1) form an indepen-
dent set; and
(iii) |l(u)| = 1 for every node u not adjacent to v1 (u 6= v1).
Based on Lemmas 1–4 we know that every weighted MC-nets can be repre-
sented as (one or more) graphs and every embedded MC-nets can be represented
as a graph satisfying conditions (i)–(iii).
Let us now explain how a game represented as a hybrid rule γ can be defined
based on graph Gγ . Fix a hybrid rule γ and consider a partition P that satisfies
it. Since every node in graph Gγ is labeled with a set of players which is equal
to the set of positive literals in some expression αi, it is clear that all these
players must appear in the same coalition in P . This observation combined
with the fact that every player appears in exactly one node implies that P can
be associated with a partition of nodes in graph Gγ .
Consider partition P ∗ of nodes that correspond to P . Note that two adja-
cent nodes cannot belong to the same coalition in P ∗, because they represent
incompatible expressions that cannot be satisfied by one coalition. Hence, every
set in P ∗ is an independent set. In result, we get that P ∗ corresponds to some
coloring of a graph.
This analysis is formalized in the following lemma.
Lemma 5. Partition P satisfies a hybrid rule γ if and only if there exists k-
coloring f ∈ Ck(Gγ) such that P = l(Pf ). Moreover:
gγ(S, P ) = c · [∃f∈Ck(Gγ)(P = l(Pf ) ∧ S = l(S
1
f ))]. (3)
Example 3. Consider a hybrid rule γ from Example 2 with graph Gγ depicted
in Figure 1. Let us discuss all possible 4-colorings of Gγ :
• There are no colorings of Gγ that uses 2 or 3 colors.
• There are 24 colorings that uses 3 colors: f(v1) = f(v4) = a, f(v2) = b
and f(v3) = c where a, b, c ∈ {1, . . . , 4} are different colors. Note that for
every such coloring f we have: Pf = {{1, 2, 6}, {3, 5}, {4}}.
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• There are 24 colorings that uses 4 colors; in these colorings all nodes have
different colors. For every such coloring f : Pf = {{1, 2}, {3, 5}, {4}, {6}}.
Overall, 48 colorings results in two partitions of players. Now, from Lemma 5,
game gγ is defined as follows:
gγ({1, 2, 6}, {{1, 2, 6}, {3, 5}, {4}}) = 1,
gγ({1, 2}, {{1, 2}, {3, 5}, {4}, {6}}) = 1,
and gγ(S, P ) = 0 for the remaining embedded coalitions.
In the following section, we consider computing extended Shapley values in
games defined with Eq. (3).
4 Computing extended Shapley values
Recall Definition 1. From Eq. (1) we know that all extended Shapley values
considered by us satisfy linearity, i.e., ESV (g + g′) = ESV (g) + ESV (g′) and
ESV (c · g) = c · ESV (g) for every two games g, g′ and c ∈ R. Thus, in our
computational analysis we can focus on games represented as a single rule and,
based on Lemmas 1 and 2, as a single hybrid rule. Moreover, we can assume
the weight of this rule is 1 (i.e., c = 1). Hence, from now on, we will assume
that game is represented as a hybrid rule with weight 1.
Fix such a hybrid rule γ. In Lemma 5, we showed that the value of an
embedded coalition (S, P ) is non-zero if and only if there exists a coloring f in
graph Gγ such that P = Pf . Since there are θ(f) colorings that results in the
same partition as f , from Lemma 5 and Eq. (1) we get the following formula
for extended Shapley values:
ESVi(g
γ) =
∑
f∈Ck(Gγ)
ωi(l(S
1
f ), l(Pf ))/θ(f). (4)
To put it in words, extended Shapley value in game gγ is a weighted sum over all
colorings in graph Gγ . Weights depend on l(Pf ) (partition of players resulting
from the coloring f), l(S1f ) (union of labels of all nodes colored with the same
color as node v1), and player i ∈ N . For an example we refer the reader to
Table 3 in the appendix.
More generally, we can consider the following counting problem that we
name Weighted Coloring Counting. The problem is parametrized with
weights ω∗ : Ck(G)→ R that for each coloring assigns some real value.
Definition 4. ω∗-Weighted Coloring Counting
Input: graph G = (V,E), labels l : V → 2N s.t. {l(v) : v ∈ V } is a partition of
players N
Output:
∑
f∈C|V |(G)
ω∗(f).
This problem in general is computationally challenging, as it generalizes the
problem of counting all k-colorings which is #P-complete and allows us to de-
termine whether a graph is 3-colorable which is NP-complete.
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Based on Eq. (4), computing each extended Shapley value for a fixed player
can be considered a special case of Weighted Coloring Counting. In the
following sections, we analyze these problems one by one. Values are ordered in
ascending order by the complexity of their formula:
• First two values, MQ-value and EF-value, take into account only one par-
tition P for every coalition S; hence, they can be computed by traversing
all subsets, not all partitions of players.
• In HY-value, considered third, the weight of an embedded coalition (S, P )
depends solely on |S| and |P |; this allows us to group all colorings that
use the same number of colors.
• Finally, in the last two values, SS-value and MY-value, weights depend on
sizes of all coalitions in a partition.
Before we move to the next section, let us roughly explain a technique
that we use in the proofs of Theorem 9, 10 and 14. Assume we want to
compute x1, . . . , xk and we have an algorithm that computes the sum f(j) =∑k
m=1 aj,mxm for some weights a that depend on m and some external param-
eter j ∈ {1, . . . , k}. To this end, we can construct a system of linear equations
with the following matrix form:

a1,1 a1,2 . . . a1,k
a2,1 a2,2 . . . a2,k
...
...
. . .
...
ak,1 ak,2 . . . ak,k

 ·


x1
x2
...
xk

 =


f(1)
f(2)
...
f(k)

 . (5)
Now, if the matrix (aj,m)1≤j,m≤k has non-zero determinant, then it is invert-
ible. Hence, if we know f(1), . . . , f(k), then using Gaussian elimination we can
compute x1, . . . , xk.
In our case, f(j) will be an extended Shapley value and xm will be the
number of independent sets of size m (Theorem 9), k-coloring that uses m
colors (Theorem 10) or matchings in a bipartite graph of size m (Theorem 14).
Hence, based on the fact that computing
∑k
m=1 xm is #P-hard we will get that
computing EF-value, HY-value and MY-value is also #P-hard.
Note that based on Eq. (4) each extended Shapley value is a sum over expo-
nentially many colorings and, in general, two colorings that result in different
partitions of nodes may have different weights. Hence, the main challenge with
this approach is to (1) express an extended Shapley value as a weighted sum over
polynomial number of elements and (2) creating a system of linear equations
that results in a matrix which is invertible.
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4.1 Computing MQ-value
We begin with the analysis of MQ-value. Consider Eq. (4) for weights of MQ-
value (Definition 1):
MQi(g
γ) =
∑
f∈Ck(Gγ)
ζi
l(S1
f
)
θ(f)
· [|l(Pf ) ≤ 2].
As we can see, only colorings that uses 1 or 2 colors have non-zero weights. It
is easy to verify that instead of going through all k-colorings it is enough to
consider 2-colorings of a graph. Using the fact that for every 2-coloring f we
have θ(f) = 2, we get:
MQi(g
γ) =
1
2
∑
f∈C2(Gγ)
ζil(S1
f
). (6)
While in a connected graph there are at most two 2-colorings, in a discon-
nected graph it can be exponentially many. Nevertheless, in Theorem 6, we
show that this sum can be computed in polynomial time for every graph.
Theorem 6. For a game represented as weighted MC-nets, MQ-value can be
computed in polynomial time.
Sketch of proof. From Lemma 1 and linearity of MQ-value we can focus on
hybrid rules with weight 1. Fix such a hybrid rule γ. We will focus on the
simplest case: i ∈ l(v1). Let us define a table T [1. . .n] as follows: T [s] = |{f ∈
C2(G
γ) : |l(S1f )| = s}|. To put it in words, T [s] is the number of 2-colorings of
Gγ in which there are s players in nodes colored with the same color as node
v1. From Eq. (6) we have:
MQi(g
γ) =
n∑
s=1
(s− 1)!(n− s)!
(2n!)
· T [s].
Thus, it is enough to compute table T .
Table T can be computed with the following dynamic programming algo-
rithm. Assume T is filled with zeros at the beginning. Let A1, . . . , Am be
connected components of graph Gγ , and let {Bj, Cj} be a unique partition of
Aj into two independent sets. Components and partitions can be found by
performing several breadth-first searches. If partition {Bj , Cj} does not ex-
ist for at least one component Aj , then the calculation is complete (T is a
zero table). Assume otherwise and assume v1 ∈ B1. We begin by assigning
T [|l(B1)|] = 2, since there are two 2-colorings of A1. Now, we consider com-
ponents A2, . . . , Am, one by one, and for each component consider two cases:
either Bj or Cj is colored with the same color as node v1. Thus, in each
step, we update table T by replacing it with a new table T ′ defined as follows:
T ′[s] = T [s − |l(Bj)|] + T [s − |l(Cj)|] for 1 ≤ s ≤ n (assuming T [s] = 0 for
s ≤ 0). After the m-th step, the calculation is complete.
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Theorem 6 implies polynomial computation also for embedded MC-nets.
Corollary 7. For game represented as embedded MC-nets, MQ-value can be
computed in polynomial time.
Proof. Directly from Theorem 6. This result was also proved by (Michalak et al.,
2010).
4.2 Computing EF-value
EF-value, considered by us next, is complementary to MQ-value. Consider
Eq. (4) for weights of EF-value (Def. 1):
EFi(g
γ) =
∑
f∈Ck(Gγ)
ζi
l(S1
f
)
θ(f)
[|Pf | − 1 = n− |l(S
1
f)|].
Note that condition |Pf | − 1 = n − |l(S1f )| holds if and only if every player
i ∈ N \ l(S1f) form a singleton coalition {i} in l(Pf ), i.e., node v such that
i ∈ l(v) has a label of size one and is colored with a different color than all other
nodes. Hence, Pf is uniquely defined by set S
1
f .
Let us analyze the conditions on set S1f . Let V
∗ be the set of nodes with
non-singleton labels. For an arbitrary set of nodes S ⊆ V , there exists a coloring
f with non-zero weight such that S = S1f if and only if: (1) S is an independent
set; (2) S contains node v1; and (3) S contains set V
∗. This implies that if
V ∗∪{v1} does not form an independent set, then the formula evaluates to zero.
Assume otherwise.
We get that S is the union of V ∗ ∪ {v1} and an independent set of nodes
which are not adjacent to V ∗ ∪{v1}. Let us denote these nodes by U (formally,
U = {u ∈ V \ (V ∗ ∪ {v1}) : {u,w} ∈ E → w 6∈ V
∗ ∪ {v1}}). Also, if S = S
1
f for
some coloring f , then there are θ(f) colorings with the same set S1f . Hence, we
get the following formula for EF-value:
EFi(g
γ) =
∑
S∈I(Gγ):S⊆U
ζil(S∪V ∗∪{v1}) (7)
where I(Gγ) is the set of all independent sets in graph Gγ .
In the following two theorems, we show that this sum is hard to compute in
general, but it is easy to compute if graph satisfies condition stated in Lemma 4.
Theorem 8. For game represented as embedded MC-nets, EF-value can be
computed in polynomial time.
Sketch of proof. From Lemma 2 it is enough to consider hybrid rules that satisfy
condition (∗) with weight 1. Fix such a hybrid rule γ and consider Gγ . If
V ∗ \ {v1} 6= ∅, i.e., there exists a node, other than v1, with the size of a label
larger than one, then from Lemma 4 it must be adjacent to v1; hence, EFi(g
γ) =
0 for every i ∈ N . Assume otherwise. We get that V ∗ ∪ {v1} = {v1}, and U
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is the set of nodes not adjacent to v1. From Lemma 4 we know that U is an
independent set. Thus, EFi(g
γ) =
∑
S⊆U ζ
i
l(S∪{v1})
which can be computed in
polynomial time.
Theorem 9. For game represented as weighted MC-nets, computing EF-value
is #P-complete.
Sketch of proof. To show that the problem is #P-complete, we use the (Turing)
reduction from the problem of counting all independent sets in a graph which
is #P-complete (Valiant, 1979). We use a technique described at the beginning
of the section (see Eq. (5)). Specifically, for an arbitrary graph G = (V,E), we
label each node with one player and add a new node, v1, labeled with j+1 new
players. We get that U = V and for i ∈ l(v1) Eq. (7) iterates over independent
sets in G and weights depends only their size and parameter j.
4.3 Computing HY-value
HY-value is the first value considered by us with non-zero weights of every
embedded coalition. Let us recall these weights from Definition 1: ωi(S, P ) =
ζiS · θ(S, P )/|P|, where θ(S, P ) = |{P
′ ∈ P : {T \ S : T ∈ P ′} = P \ {S}}|. To
put it in word, θ(S, P ) is the number of partitions that can be obtained from
P \ {S} by inserting players from S.
Let us introduce a notion of Bell numbers. The n-th Bell number, denoted
Bn, is the number of all possible partitions of n elements. Now, r-Bell numbers
are a generalization of Bell numbers: Bn,r is the number of partitions of n+ r
elements such that the first r elements are in distinct subsets (Mezo, 2011). In
particular, Bn,0 = Bn and Bn,1 = Bn+1.
Now, observe that θ(S, P ) = B|S|,|P |−1. Thus, HY-value weights combined
with Eq. (4) yields:
HYi(g
γ) =
1
Bn
∑
f∈Ck(Gγ)
ζi
l(S1
f
)
θ(f)
·B|l(S1
f
)|,|l(Pf )|−1. (8)
Thus, for a fixed player i and size of l(S1f ), the weight of a coloring depends
solely on the number of colors it uses (see Table 2 for an illustration).
We will prove that computing this sum is #P-complete.
Theorem 10. For game represented as embedded MC-nets or weighted MC-
nets, computing HY-value is #P-complete.
Sketch of proof. To show that the problem is #P-complete, we use the (Turing)
reduction from the chromatic polynomial problem, i.e., counting m-colorings in
a graph, which is #P-complete (Jaeger et al., 1990).
Let G = (V,E) be an arbitrary graph and cm be the number of k-colorings
that use exactly m colors. For every j ∈ {1, . . . , k} we construct a graph Gγj =
(V ∪ {v1}, E ∪ {{v1, vi} : vi ∈ V ) with l(vi) = {i} for vi ∈ V and l(v1) =
{1}∪ {k+ 2, . . . , k+ j}. Since node v1 is connected to all other nodes we know
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that Gγj satisfies conditions from Lemma 4 and there exists a hybrid rule γj
equivalent to some embedded MC-nets rule such that Gγj is the corresponding
graph. Now, it can be shown that
HY1(g
γj ) =
(j − 1)!
(k + j)!Bk+j
k∑
m=1
(k −m)!Bj,mcm.
In result, we get a system of linear equations from Eq. (5) where aj,m = (k −
m)!Bj,m, xm = cm and f(j) = ((k + j)!/(j − 1)!)Bk+jHY1(gγj ).
To show that the determinant of A = (aj,m)1≤j,m≤k is non-zero we first
prove a general formula for r-Bell numbers (Lemma 11) and then, using this
formula, we prove that the determinant of matrix (Bj,m)1≤j,m≤k is equal to the
known determinant of matrix (Bj+m)1≤j,m≤k (Lemma 12).
Lemma 11. For every n, r ∈ N, Bn+r =
∑r
i=1{r, i}Bn,i, where {r, i} is the
Stirling number of the second kind, i.e., the number of partitions of r elements
into i subsets.
Lemma 12. The determinant of matrix B = (Bj,m)1≤j,m≤k equals (
∏k
i=0 i!) ·
(
∑k
i=0 1/i!).
This concludes the proof.
4.4 Computing SS-value
SS-value, considered next, is probably the most popular extended Shapley value.
Weights of SS-value (see Definition 1) combined with Eq. (4) yields:
SSi(g
γ) =
∑
f∈Ck(Gγ)
ζi
l(S1
f
)
θ(f)
∏
T∈Pf\{S1f}
(|l(T )| − 1)!
(n− |l(S1f)|)!
.
In what follows, let us focus on graphs in which every node is labeled with
a single player: |l(v)| = 1 for every v ∈ V . In such a case, we have n = k = |V |
and |l(T )| = |T |. Under this assumption, formula for SS-value of player i ∈ l(v1)
is as follows:
SSi(g
γ) =
∑
f∈Ck(Gγ)
∏
T∈Pf
(|T | − 1)!
θ(f) · n!
. (9)
For a fixed partition P ∈ P , value
∏
T∈P (|T |−1)! is the number of all permuta-
tions in which P is the partition obtained from a cycle decomposition (for a per-
mutation h : N → N such partition is defined as follows: {{i, h(i), h(h(i)), . . .} :
i ∈ N}). Hence, Eq. (9) is the probability that the partition obtained from a
cycle decomposition of a random permutation corresponds to a (proper vertex)
coloring in graph Gγ .
Let us consider a complement of graph Gγ = (V,E):
Gγ = (V, {{i, j} : i, j ∈ V, i 6= j} \ E).
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For every coloring f ∈ Ck(Gγ), sets of nodes in Pf are independent sets in Gγ .
Hence, they are cliques in Gγ . As a consequence, we get that SSi(g
γ) from
Eq. (9) is equivalently a weighted sum over clique covers (i.e., partitions of the
nodes in a graph into cliques):
SSi(g
γ) =
1
n!
∑
P∈QC(Gγ)
∏
T∈P
(|T | − 1)!, (10)
where QC(G) is the set of all clique covers in graph G.
Now, assume that Gγ is a bipartite graph. In such a case, there are no
cliques of size larger than 2 and each partition into cliques is equivalent to a
matching (not necessary perfect or maximal) in this graph. Moreover, for each
such a partition we have
∏
T∈P (|T |−1)! = 1 (see also Table 2). Hence, Eq. (10)
is equal to the number of matchings in Gγ divided by n!. We formalize this
reasoning in the following theorem.
Theorem 13. For game represented as embedded MC-nets or weighted MC-
nets, computing SS-value is #P-complete.
Sketch of proof. To show that the problem is #P-complete, we use a reduction
from the problem of counting all matchings in a bipartite graph which is #P-
complete (Valiant, 1979). For an arbitrary bipartite graph G = (V,E) we
construct a graph Gγ by adding a new node, v1, and we label each node with
one player. Since node v1 does not have any edges in Gγ , then it is connected to
all nodes in Gγ ; hence, Gγ satisfies conditions of Lemma 4 and from Lemma 2
there exist a hybrid rule γ equivalent to some embedded MC-nets rule such that
Gγ is the corresponding graph.
Now, from Eq. (10) for i ∈ l(v1) we get that SSi(gγ)/n! equals the number
of matchings in Gγ , so also in G.
4.5 Computing MY-value
The last value that we consider is MY-value which is the first chronologically
proposed extension of the Shapley value to games with externalities. Eq. (4) for
weights of MY-value (Definition 1) gives:
MYi(g
γ) =
∑
f∈Ck(Gγ)
(−1)|Pf |(|Pf | − 2)!
θ(f)
· hi(f),
with hi(f) =
(∑
T∈Pf\{S1f},i6∈l(T )
1
(n−|l(T )|)
)
− |Pf |−1
n
. From Table 2 it is visible
that both techniques used for HY-value and SS-value does not work in this case.
To cope with this problem, we will exploit the fact that weights of MY-value
have a form of a sum over all coalitions. Specifically, we will consider a difference
between the MY-value of two players. Let us denote such difference for players
i and j in game g by ∆ji (g): ∆
j
i (g) =MYi(g)−MYj(g). Now, for i ∈ l(S
1
f) and
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j ∈ l(T ) for some T ∈ Pf \ {S1f} we get hi(f)− hj(f) = 1/(n− |T |) and
∆ji (g
γ) =
∑
f∈Ck(Gγ)
(−1)|Pf |(|Pf | − 2)!
θ(f) · (n− |l(T )|)
. (11)
Note that if j is in a label of a node adjacent to all other nodes, then the weight
of a coloring depends solely on the number of colors it uses. Hence, we can use
a technique described at the beginning of this section (see Eq. (5)).
Theorem 14. For game represented as embedded MC-nets or weighted MC-
nets, computing MY-value is #P-complete.
Sketch of proof. To show that the problem is #P-complete, again we use the re-
duction from the problem of counting all matching in a bipartite graph which is
#P-complete (Valiant, 1979). With the same reasoning as in SS-value, instead
of considering colorings in graph Gγ we will focus on clique covers in the comple-
ment graph Gγ . For an arbitrary bipartite graph G = (V,E) for j ∈ {1, . . . , k},
we construct a graph Gγj by adding j + 2 isolated nodes and consider ∆ji for
two players from newly added nodes. In this way, based on Eq. (11) we build a
system of linear equations, as in Eq. (5).
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we studied the complexity of computing extended Shapley value in
games represented as embedded and weighted MC-nets. Our results show that
weighted MC-nets, which are more concise than embedded MC-nets, are slightly
worse when it comes to the Shapley value computation. Also, combined with the
work by Skibski et al. (2015), we get that computational properties of partition
decision trees are significantly better than both MC-nets representations.
There are many possible directions of further research. The extended Shap-
ley value proposed by Bolger (1989), as well as other solution concepts can be
considered. Also, it would be interesting to analyze hybrid rules and corre-
sponding graphs not as a representation, but as a graph-restriction scheme for
games with externalities (Myerson, 1977a).
16
References
Abe, T. & Funaki, Y. (2017). The non-emptiness of the core of a partition
function form game. International Journal of Game Theory, 46 (3), 715–736.
Aigner, M. (1999). A characterization of the Bell numbers. Discrete mathemat-
ics, 205 (1-3), 207–210.
Bacher, R. (2002). Determinants of matrices related to the Pascal triangle.
Journal de the´orie des nombres de Bordeaux, 14 (1), 19–41.
Bolger, E. M. (1989). A set of axioms for a value for partition function games.
International Journal of Game Theory, 18 (1), 37–44.
Chalkiadakis, G., Elkind, E., & Wooldridge, M. (2011). Computational aspects
of cooperative game theory. Synthesis Lectures on Artificial Intelligence and
Machine Learning, 5 (6), 1–168.
De Clippel, G. & Serrano, R. (2008). Marginal contributions and externalities
in the value. Econometrica, 76 (6), 1413–1436.
Dunne, P. E. (2005). Multiagent resource allocation in the presence of external-
ities. In Multi-Agent Systems and Applications IV (pp. 408–417). Springer.
Feldman, B. E. (1996). Bargaining, coalition formation, and value. PhD thesis,
State University of New York at Stony Brook.
Hu, C.-C. & Yang, Y.-Y. (2010). An axiomatic characterization of a value for
games in partition function form. SERIEs, 1 (4), 475–487.
Ieong, S. & Shoham, Y. (2005). Marginal contribution nets: A compact rep-
resentation scheme for coalitional games. In Proceedings of the 6th ACM
Conference on Electronic Commerce (ACM-EC), (pp. 193–202).
Jaeger, F., Vertigan, D. L., & Welsh, D. J. (1990). On the computational
complexity of the Jones and Tutte polynomials. Mathematical Proceedings of
the Cambridge Philosophical Society, 108 (1), 35–53.
Ko´czy, L. A´. (2018). The Shapley-value. In Partition Function Form Games:
Coalitional Games with Externalities (pp. 173–200). Springer.
Macho-Stadler, I., Pe´rez-Castrillo, D., & Wettstein, D. (2007). Sharing the sur-
plus: An extension of the Shapley value for environments with externalities.
Journal of Economic Theory, 135 (1), 339–356.
McQuillin, B. (2009). The extended and generalized Shapley value: Simultane-
ous consideration of coalitional externalities and coalitional structure. Journal
of Economic Theory, 144 (2), 696–721.
Mezo, I. (2011). The r-Bell numbers. Journal of Integer Sequences, 14 (2), 3.
17
Michalak, T. P., Marciniak, D., Szamotulski, M., Rahwan, T., Wooldridge, M.,
McBurney, P., & Jennings, N. R. (2010). A logic-based representation for
coalitional games with externalities. In Proceedings of the 9th International
Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), (pp.
125–132).
Michalak, T. P., Rahwan, T., Marciniak, D., Szamotulski, M., & Jennings, N. R.
(2010). Computational aspects of extending the Shapley value to coalitional
games with externalities. In Proceedings of the 19th European Conference on
Artificial Intelligence (ECAI), (pp. 197–202).
Myerson, R. B. (1977a). Graphs and cooperation in games. Mathematical
Methods of Operations Research, 2 (3), 225–229.
Myerson, R. B. (1977b). Values of games in partition function form. Interna-
tional Journal of Game Theory, 6, 23–31.
Pham Do, K. H. & Norde, H. (2007). The Shapley value for partition function
form games. International Game Theory Review, 9 (02), 353–360.
Rahwan, T., Michalak, T. P., Wooldridge, M., & Jennings, N. R. (2012). Any-
time coaliton structure generation in multi-agent systems with positive or
negative externalities. Artificial Intelligence, 186 (0), 95–122.
Shapley, L. S. (1953). A value for n-person games. In H. Kuhn & A. Tucker
(Eds.), Contributions to the Theory of Games, volume II (pp. 307–317).
Princeton University Press.
Skibski, O., Matejczyk, S., Michalak, T., Wooldridge, M., & Yokoo, M. (2016).
k-Coalitional cooperative games. In Proceedings of the 15th International
Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), (pp.
177–185).
Skibski, O., Michalak, T. P., Sakurai, Y., Wooldridge, M., & Yokoo, M. (2015).
A graphical representation for games in partition function form. In Proceed-
ings of the 29th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), (pp.
1036–1042).
Skibski, O., Michalak, T. P., & Wooldridge, M. (2018). The Stochastic Shapley
value for games with externalities. Games and Economic Behavior, 108, 65–
80.
Valiant, L. G. (1979). The complexity of enumeration and reliability problems.
SIAM Journal on Computing, 8 (3), 410–421.
Yi, S.-S. (2003). Endogenous formation of economic coalitions: A survey on
the partition function approach. In The Endogenous Formation of Economic
Coalitions (pp. 80–127). London, UK: Edward Elgar.
18
f |Pf | θ(f) l(S
1
f) l(Pf ) \ {l(S
1
f)}
ω1(l(S
1
f ), l(Pf ))
MQ EF HY SS MY
1 2 3 4,6 5 2 20 {1,3,4,6} {{2, 5}} 1 0 52 6 5
1 2 3 4,6 5 2 20 {1, 3, 5} {{2, 4, 6}} 1 0 15 4 10
1 2 3 4,6 5 3 60 {1,3,4,6} {{2}, {5}} 0 1 151 6 -4
1 2 3 4,6 5 3 60 {1, 3, 5} {{2}, {4, 6}} 0 0 37 2 -7
1 2 3 4,6 5 3 60 {1, 4, 6} {{2, 5}, {3}} 0 0 37 2 -7
1 2 3 4,6 5 3 60 {1, 4, 6} {{2}, {3, 5}} 0 0 37 2 -7
1 2 3 4,6 5 3 60 {1, 3} {{2, 5}, {4, 6}} 0 0 20 1 -10
1 2 3 4,6 5 3 60 {1, 3} {{2, 4, 6}, {5}} 0 0 20 2 -12
1 2 3 4,6 5 3 60 {1, 5} {{2, 4, 6}, {3}} 0 0 20 2 -12
1 2 3 4,6 5 3 60 {1, 5} {{2}, {3, 4, 6}} 0 0 20 2 -12
1 2 3 4,6 5 3 60 {1} {{2, 4, 6}, {3, 5}} 0 0 30 2 -15
1 2 3 4,6 5 3 60 {1} {{2, 5}, {3, 4, 6}} 0 0 30 2 -15
1 2 3 4,6 5 4 120 {1, 4, 6} {{2}, {3}, {5}} 0 1 77 2 12
1 2 3 4,6 5 4 120 {1, 3} {{2}, {4, 6}, {5}} 0 0 34 1 18
1 2 3 4,6 5 4 120 {1, 5} {{2}, {3}, {4, 6}} 0 0 34 1 18
1 2 3 4,6 5 4 120 {1} {{2, 5}, {3}, {4, 6}} 0 0 40 1 24
1 2 3 4,6 5 4 120 {1} {{2}, {3, 5}, {4, 6}} 0 0 40 1 24
1 2 3 4,6 5 4 120 {1} {{2, 4, 6}, {3}, {5}} 0 0 40 2 28
1 2 3 4,6 5 4 120 {1} {{2}, {3, 4, 6}, {5}} 0 0 40 2 28
1 2 3 4,6 5 5 120 {1} {{2},{3},{4,6},{5}} 0 0 40 1 -66
× 160 ×
1
60 ×
1
12180 ×
1
7200 ×
1
60
Table 3: Example of weights associated with all possible colorings in a sim-
ple graph according to extended Shapley values. Graph G = (V,E) has
V = {v1, . . . , v5} and E = {{v1, v2}, {v2, v3}, {v4, v5}} and labels: l(vi) = i
for i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 5} and l(v4) = {4, 6} and we consider all 5-colorings f : V →
{1, . . . , 5} (isomorphic colorings are grouped). For each value, the last row con-
tains a common multiplier.
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A Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. Consider a weighted MC-nets rule:
(α11 → c
1
1) . . . (α
1
k1
→ c1k1)| . . . |(α
m
1 → c
m
1 ) . . . (α
m
km
→ cmkm).
Assume ⊕(αij) ∩ ⊕(α
i′
j′ ) 6= ∅ for some i, i
′ ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, j ∈ {1, . . . , ki}, j′ ∈
{1, . . . , ki′}. If i 6= i′ or i = i′ but expressions αij and α
i′
j′ are not compatible,
then the weighted MC-nets rule is contradictory; hence it is equivalent to an
empty set of hybrid rules. If i = i′ and αij and α
i′
j′ are compatible, then rules
(αij → c
i
j) and (α
i′
j′ → c
i′
j′ ) can be combined into (α
i
j ∧α
i′
j′ → (c
i
j + c
i′
j′ )). Hence,
in what follows, we assume that ⊕(αij)∩⊕(α
i′
j′) = ∅ for every i, i
′ ∈ {1, . . . ,m},
j ∈ {1, . . . , ki}, j′ ∈ {1, . . . , ki′}.
Define ⊕i =
⋃ki
j=1⊕(α
i
j) for every i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and ⊕ =
⋃m
i=1⊕
i. Now,
define βij as α
i
j with players ⊕ \ ⊕
i added as negative literals for every i ∈
{1, . . . ,m} and j ∈ {1, . . . , ki}. Since β
i
j , β
i′
j′ for i 6= i
′ cannot be satisfied by the
same coalition, we get that the following weighted MC-nets rule without bars
(”|”) is equivalent to the original one:
(β11 → c
1
1) . . . (β
i
j → c
i
j) . . . (β
m
km
→ cmkm).
In each MC-nets rule we added at most S literals, so the size of this rule is
O(S2).
Now, we divide the formula for k1 + · · · + km separate rules in which only
one weight c is non-zero:
(β11 → c
1
1)(β
1
2 → 0) . . . (β
i
j → 0) . . . (β
m
km
→ 0)
(β11 → 0)(β
1
2 → c
1
2) . . . (β
i
j → 0) . . . (β
m
km
→ 0)
. . .
(β11 → 0)(β
1
2 → 0) . . . (β
i
j → 0) . . . (β
m
km
→ cmkm).
The size of this set of rules is O(S3).
Finally, for every player p ∈ N \ ⊕ we add an MC-nets rule ((p) → 0) to
every rule. We added at most n MC-nets rules to O(S) rules; hence, the total
size of the final set of rules is O(S3 + nS). This concludes the proof.
B Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. Consider an embedded MC-nets rule:
(α1|α2, . . . , αk)→ c.
For this rule we will construct an equivalent hybrid rule.
Assume ⊕(αi) ∩ ⊕(αj) 6= ∅ for some 1 ≤ i < j ≤ k. If i = 1 or αi and αj
are not compatible, then the embedded MC-nets rule is contradictory; hence
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it is equivalent to any hybrid rule with c = 0. If i, j > 1 and αi and αj are
compatible, then αi and αj can be replaced by αi ∧αj . Hence, in what follows,
we assume that ⊕(αi) ∩ ⊕(αj) = ∅ for every i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,mk}.
Let us define expressions β1 as α1 with ⊕(α2)∪· · ·∪⊕(αk) added as negative
literals. Since β1 and αi for any i > 1 cannot be now satisfied by the same
coalition, we get that the following weighted MC-nets rule is equivalent to the
original one:
(β1 → c)(α2 → 0) . . . (αk → 0).
Note that this may not be a hybrid rule, since not all players may appear as
positive literals. Hence, we add an MC-nets rule ((p) → 0) for every player
p ∈ N \
⋃k
i=1⊕(αi).
Note that the resulting hybrid rule satisfies condition (∗): only MC-nets
rules of the form ((p)→ 0) are compatible with β1 and indeed each of them has
one positive literal and they are all compatible with each other.
For the original embedded MC-nets rule of size S, the size of the resulting
hybrid rule is O(S2 +N).
Now, consider a hybrid rule satisfying (∗):
(α1 → c)(α2 → 0) . . . (αk → 0).
For this rule we will construct an equivalent embedded MC-nets rule.
Without loss of generality assume expressions αm+1, . . . , αk are compatible
with α1. Fix i > m. We know that | ⊕ (αi)| = 1. Assume ⊖(αi) 6= ∅ and
take player p ∈ ⊖(αi). From the definition of hybrid rules we know that every
player appears as a positive literal somewhere, i.e., there exists αj such that
p ∈ ⊕(αj). Hence, we can remove ¬p from αi and add a player from ⊕(αi) as
a negative literal in αj (unless it is already in ⊖(αj)—in such a case addition
can be omitted) without changing the satisfiability of the rule. From (∗) we get
that αj is not compatible with α1; hence, condition (∗) will still be satisfied.
By doing so for every negative literal of every rule compatible with α1 (other
than α1), we will obtain a rule of the form:
(α1 → c)(β2 → 0) . . . (βm → 0)((p1)→ 0) . . . ((pl)→ 0),
in which all β2, . . . , βm are not compatible with α1. Hence, this rule is equivalent
to an embedded MC-nets rule:
(α1|β2, . . . , βm)→ c.
Note that the size of the resulting embedded MC-nets rule is smaller than
the size of the original hybrid rule. This concludes the proof.
C Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. Fix a hybrid rule γ. From Definition 2 we know that {⊕(αi) : 1 ≤ i ≤ k}
is a partition of N . Hence, from Definition 3 {l(vi) : vi ∈ V } is also a partition
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of N . In result, if graph G = (V,E) has labels l such that {l(vi) : vi ∈ V } is
not a partition of N , then G is not equal to Gγ for any γ.
On the other hand, let G = (V,E) be a graph with labels l such that {l(vi) :
vi ∈ V } is a partition of N . We can now construct a hybrid rule γ as follows:
for every node vi ∈ V we create a boolean expression αi as in Eq. (2) with l(vi)
as positive literals and
⋃
vj :{vi,vj}∈E
l(vj) as negative literals. Now, it is easy to
verify that for γ = (α1 → 1)(α2 → 0) . . . (α|V | → 0) we have G = G
γ .
D Proof of Lemma 4
Proof. Fix a hybrid rule γ that satisfies condition (∗). From Lemma 3 we know
that Gγ satisfies (i). From condition (∗) we get that all expressions compatible
with α1 are compatible with each other and have a single positive literal. Hence,
nodes in Gγ not adjacent to v1 form an independent set (ii) and have labels of
size 1 (iii).
On the other hand, let G = (V,E) be a graph that satisfies conditions (i)–
(iii). To construct a hybrid rule γ that satisfies condition (∗) we repeat the con-
struction from the proof of Lemma 3: for every node vi ∈ V we create a boolean
expression αi as in Eq. (2) with l(vi) as positive literals and
⋃
vj :{vi,vj}∈E
l(vj)
as negative literals. Now, it is easy to verify that for γ = (α1 → 1)(α2 →
0) . . . (α|V | → 0) we have G = G
γ . Clearly, if vi and vj are not adjacent, then
αi and αj are compatible. Hence, from (ii) and (iii) we get that γ satisfies
condition (∗).
E Proof of Lemma 5
Proof. Assume P = {S1, . . . , Sm} satisfies γ. We have that:
(i) every expression αi is satisfied by exactly one coalition (it is not possible
that ⊕(αi) is a subset of two non-overlapping coalitions);
(ii) every coalition Sr satisfies at least one expression (for an arbitrary player
p ∈ Sr we know that there exists an expression αj such that p ∈ ⊕(αj);
hence only Sr may satisfy αj).
Let us define a function f as follows: f(vi) = r such that ⊕(αi) ⊆ Sr (from (i)
we know there exists exactly one such r). Function f is a proper coloring: if
f(vi) = f(vj) = r, then coalition Sr satisfies both αi and αj , hence they are
compatible and {vi, vj} 6∈ E. Also, f is a k-coloring, because m ≤ k (from (i)
and (ii)).
Now, take k-coloring f of Gγ and consider l(Pf ). Fix vi ∈ V and take
l(Sif) (i.e., set of all players in nodes colored with the same color as node vi).
We claim l(Sif ) satisfies αi. Obviously, ⊕(αi) ⊆ l(S
i
f). On the other hand,
⊖(αi) ∩ l(Sif ) = ∅, because players from ⊖(αi) all appear in nodes which are
neighbors of vi in graph G
γ , hence have different colors than vi.
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So far, we have proved that P satisfies a hybrid rule γ if and only if there
exists a k-coloring f ∈ Ck(Gγ) such that P = l(Pf ). Now, (S, P ) has non-
zero value if and only if P satisfies γ and S satisfies α1 which—in a partition
satisfying γ—is equivalent to containing all players from nodes colored with the
same color as node v1. This proves Eq. (3).
F Proof of Theorem 6
Proof. From Lemma 1 we know that it is enough to show that MQ-value can
be computed in polynomial time for a game represented as a single hybrid rule.
Fix a hybrid rule γ. We begin by calculating MQi(g
γ) for i ∈ l(v1). From
Eq. (6) we have:
MQi(g
γ) =
∑
f∈C2(Gγ)
(|l(S1f )| − 1)!(n− |l(S
1
f )|)!
2n!
.
Let us define a table T [1. . .n] as follows:
T [s] = |{f ∈ C2(G
γ) : |l(S1f)| = s}|.
To put it in words, for s ∈ {1, . . . , n}, T [s] is the number of 2-colorings in which
there are s players in nodes colored with the same color as node v1. We have
now:
MQi(g
γ) =
n∑
s=1
(s− 1)!(n− s)!
2n!
T [s].
To compute table T , we begin with basic facts about 2-colorings in a graph.
Graph is 2-colorable if and only if it is bipartite, i.e., nodes can be partitioned
into two groups V = V1∪˙V2, such that V1 and V2 are independent sets. If a
bipartite graph is connected (i.e., there exists a path between any two nodes),
then there exist a unique such partition. It can be found by performing a
breadth-first search from any node, v ∈ V , and putting all nodes at even distance
from v in set V1 and all nodes at odd distance—in set V2. Note that creating
such a partition and checking whether both groups are independent sets is also
a good way of checking whether the graph is 2-colorable. Now, there are two
2-colorings: in the first one nodes from V1 are colored with color 1, and in the
second one—with color 2.
On the other hand, if the graph is not connected, then it is 2-colorable if
its every connected component (i.e., maximal subset of nodes such that there
exists a path between every pair of nodes) is 2-colorable. In such a case, for
each connected component there exists a unique partition into independent sets.
However, in the whole graph there may be an exponential number of 2-colorings.
Building upon our analysis, let us now describe the algorithm that computes
table T . Assume T is filled with zeros at the beginning. Let A1, . . . , Am be
connected components of graph Gγ , and let {Bj, Cj} be a partition of Aj into
two independent sets. Components and partitions can be found by performing
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several breadth-first searches. If partition {Bj , Cj} does not exist for at least
one component Aj , then the calculation is complete (T is a zero table). Assume
otherwise and assume v1 ∈ B1. We begin by assigning T [|l(B1)|] = 2, since
there are two 2-colorings of A1. Now, we consider components A2, . . . , Am, one
by one, and for each component consider two cases: either Bj or Cj is colored
with the same color as node v1. Thus, in each step, we update table T by
replacing it with a new table T ′ defined as follows:
T ′[s] = T [s− |l(Bj)|] + T [s− |l(Cj)|] for 1 ≤ s ≤ n, (12)
assuming T [s] = 0 for s ≤ 0. After the m-th step, the calculation is complete.
Using table T we compute MQi(g
γ) in polynomial time.
So far, we have shown how to compute MQi(g
γ) for i ∈ l(v1). Assume
i ∈ N \ l(v1) and let u ∈ V be such i ∈ l(u). From Eq. (6) we have:
MQi(g
γ) =
∑
f∈C2(G
γ)
f(v1)=f(u)
(|l(S1f )| − 1)!(n− |l(S
1
f)|)!
2n!
−
∑
f∈C2(G
γ)
f(v1) 6=f(u)
|l(S1f )|!(n− |l(S
1
f)| − 1)!
2n!
.
Now, if u ∈ B1, then always f(v1) = f(u) and MQi(gγ) is the same as for
players from l(v1). If u ∈ C1, then always f(v1) 6= f(u) and MQi(gγ) =
−
∑n
s=1
s!(n−s−1)!
2n! T [s].
Finally, assume u ∈ Aj for some j > 1. Without loss of generality assume
u ∈ Bj . Now, assume table T is split into two parts: T= with colorings such
that f(v1) = f(u) and T 6= with colorings such that f(v1) 6= f(u). This leads to
the following formula:
MQi(g
γ) =
n∑
s=1
(s− 1)!(n− s)!
2n!
T=[s]−
n∑
s=1
s!(n− s− 1)!
2n!
T 6=[s].
Matrices T= and T 6= can be computed in a number of ways. One way is to
assume that component Aj was considered last in the construction of table
T (obviously, the result of the construction does not depend on the order of
components considered) and reverse step from Eq. (12); then, matrices can be
obtained with equations: T=[s] = T [s − |l(Bj)|] and T 6=[s] = T [s − |l(Cj)|]
for every s ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Alternatively, matrices can be initiated by assigning
T=[|l(B1)| + |l(Bj)|] = 2 and T 6=[|l(B1)| + |l(Cj)|] = 2 and then step from
Eq. (12) can be repeated for both matrices for components other than A1 and
Aj . Knowing matrices T= and T 6= we can compute MQi(g
γ) in polynomial
time. This concludes the proof.
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G Proof of Theorem 8
Proof. Let γ be a hybrid rule satisfying condition (∗) (from Lemma 2 we know
that for every embedded MC-nets rule such equivalent hybrid rule exists).
First, assume V ∗ \ {v1} 6= ∅, i.e., there exists a node, other than v1, with
the size of a label larger than one. Clearly, this condition can be checked in
polynomial time. From Lemma 4, we know that in Gγ nodes not adjacent to v1
have singleton labels. Hence, this node must be adjacent to v1 and V
∗ ∪ {v1}
does not form an independent set. As we already argued, in such a case the
formula evaluates to zero: EFi(g
γ) = 0 for every i ∈ N .
Assume otherwise that V ∗ \ {v1} = ∅, i.e., nodes other than v1 are labeled
with singleton sets. We get that V ∗ ∪ {v1} = {v1} and U is the set of nodes
not adjacent to node v1. From Lemma 4, we get that U is an independent set.
Thus, from Eq. (7):
EFi(g
γ) =
∑
S⊆U
ζil(S∪{v1}).
Note that |l(v1)| = n − k + 1 and |l(S ∪ {v1})| = |S| + n − k + 1. Therefore,
for i ∈ l(v1), we get EFi(gγ) =
∑|U|
s=0
(s+n−k)!(k−s−1)!
n! . For i ∈ l(U), we get
EFi(g
γ) =
∑|U|
s=1
(s+n−k)!(k−s−1)!
n! −
∑|U|−1
s=0
(s+n−k+1)!(k−s−2)!
n! = 0. Finally, for
i ∈ N \ (l(v1) ∪ l(U)), we get: EFi(gγ) = −
∑|U|
s=0
(s+n−k+1)!(k−s−2)!
n! . Each of
this sum can be computed in polynomial time. This concludes the proof.
H Proof of Theorem 9
Proof. The value n!EFi(g
γ) can be considered as the number of accepting paths
of nondeterministic Turing machine, so the problem is in #P. To show that the
problem is #P-hard, we use the (Turing) reduction from the problem of counting
all independent sets in a graph which is #P-complete (Valiant, 1979).
Let G = (V,E) be an arbitrary graph with V = {v2, . . . , vk+1} for notational
convenience. Let Im(G) be the set of independent sets of size m in graph G.
We will determine |Im(G)| for every m ∈ {0, . . . , k}.
To this end, let us construct k+1 graphs: for j ∈ {0, . . . , k}, construct graph
Gγj = (V ∪{v1}, E) with l(vi) = {i} for vi ∈ V and l(v1) = {1}∪{k+2, . . . , k+
j + 1} (based on Lemma 3 we know that for every graph G there exists hybrid
rule γ such that G = Gγ). Note that V ∗ ∪ {v1} = {v1} and U = V . Hence,
Eq. (7) for i = 1 and graph Gγj simplifies to:
EF1(g
γj ) =
k∑
m=0
(m+ j)!(k −m)!
(k + j + 1)!
|Im(G)|.
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This system of linear equations is equivalent to the following matrix form:

0!k! 1!(k − 1)! . . . k!0!
1!k! 2!(k − 1)! . . . (k + 1)!0!
...
...
. . .
...
k!k! (k + 1)!(k − 1)! . . . (2k)!0!

 ·


|I0(G)|
|I1(G)|
...
|Ik(G)|

 =


(k + 1)!EF1(g
γ0)
(k + 2)!EF1(g
γ1)
...
(2k + 1)!EF1(g
γk)


From (Bacher, 2002, Theorem 1.1), we know that the determinant of matrix A =
((i + j)!)0≤i,j≤k equals
∏k
i=0(i!)
2; hence, the determinant of the square matrix
is
∏k
i=0(i!)
3 (columns of A are multiplied by k!, . . . , 0!). Since the determinant
is non-zero, the matrix is invertible and knowing EF1(g
γ0), . . . , EF1(g
γk) allows
us to find IS0, . . . , ISk in polynomial time using Gaussian elimination.
I Proof of Lemma 11
Proof. Take r first elements from n+r and consider all their possible partitions.
There are {r, i} partitions of r elements into i subsets which implies there are
{r, i}Bn,i partitions of n+ r elements in which first r elements form i subsets.
Summing over all i ∈ {1, . . . , r} concludes the proof.
J Proof of Lemma 12
Proof. Matrix B looks as follows
B =


B1,1 B1,2 . . . B1,k
B2,1 B2,2 . . . B2,k
...
...
. . .
...
Bk,1 Bk,2 . . . Bk,k


Consider matrix:
C =


{1, 1} {2, 1} {3, 1} . . . {k, 1}
0 {2, 2} {3, 2} . . . {k, 2}
0 0 {3, 3} . . . {k, 3}
...
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 0 . . . {k, k}


Since {i, i} = 1 for every i ∈ N, matrix C is triangular with diagonal 1, so
det(C) = 1. Consider the product B · C. Multiplying by C is equivalent to
adding to column j columns 1, 2, . . . , j− 1 with weights {j, 1}, {j, 2}, . . . , {j, j−
1}. Consider field (i, j) in the new matrix. From Lemma 11, we know that:
Bi,1 · {j, 1}+ · · ·+Bi,j · {j, j} = Bi+j .
Hence, B ·C = (Bi+j)1≤i,j≤k. Now, from (Aigner, 1999, Remark 2) we get that
the determinant of matrix (Bi+j)1≤i,j≤k is (
∑k
i=0 k!/(k− i)!) ·(
∏k−1
i=0 i!) which is
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equivalent to (
∏k
i=0 i!) · (
∑k
i=0 1/i!). Hence, it is also the determinant of matrix
B.
K Proof of Theorem 10
Proof. The value P · HYi(gγ) can be considered as the number of accepting
paths of nondeterministic Turing machine, so the problem is in #P. To show
that the problem is #P-hard, we use the (Turing) reduction from the chro-
matic polynomial problem, i.e., counting m-colorings in a graph, which is #P-
complete (Jaeger et al., 1990).
Let G = (V,E) be an arbitrary graph with V = {v2, . . . , vk+1} for notational
convenience and m be an arbitrary number. The task is to determine |Cm(G)|.
Let ci be the number of k-colorings that uses exactly i colors. We will determine
ci for every i ∈ {1, . . . , k}. From these values it is easy to compute the number
of m-colorings with the following formula:
|Cm(G)| =
k∑
i=1
m(m− 1) · · · (m− i+ 1)
k(k − 1) · · · (k − i+ 1)
· ci.
To this end, let us construct k graphs: for j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, construct graph
Gγj = (V ∪ {v1}, E ∪ {{v1, vi} : vi ∈ V ) with l(vi) = {i} for vi ∈ V and
l(v1) = {1}∪{k+2, . . . , k+ j}. Since node v1 is connected to all other nodes we
know that Gγj satisfies condition from Lemma 4, i.e., there exists hybrid rule γj
equivalent to some embedded MC-nets rule such that Gγj is the corresponding
graph. Note that S1f = {1} for every coloring f . Also, the number of (k + 1)-
colorings of graph Gγj that uses m+ 1 colors is equal to (k + 1) (color of node
v1) times the number of k-colorings of graph G that uses m colors:
|{f ∈ Ck+1(G
γ) : |Pf | = m+ 1}| = (k + 1) · cm.
Hence, Eq. (8) for i = 1 and graph Gγj yields:
HYi(g
γj ) =
(j − 1)!k!
(k + j)!Bk+j
∑
f∈Ck+1(Gγ)
Bj,|l(Pf )|−1
θ(f)
=
(j − 1)!k!
(k + j)!Bk+j
k+1∑
m=2
∑
f∈Ck+1(Gγ):|Pf |=m
Bj,(m−1)(
k+1
m
)
m!
=
(j − 1)!k! · (k + 1)
(k + j)!Bk+j
k+1∑
m=2
Bj,(m−1)(
k+1
m
)
m!
cm−1
=
(j − 1)!(k + 1)!
(k + j)!Bk+j
k∑
m=1
(k −m)!Bj,m
(k + 1)!
cm
=
(j − 1)!
(k + j)!Bk+j
k∑
m=1
(k −m)!Bj,mcm.
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This system of linear equations can be presented in the matrix form as follows:


(k − 1)!B1,1 (k − 2)!B1,2 . . . 0!B1,k
(k − 1)!B2,1 (k − 2)!B2,2 . . . 0!B2,k
...
...
. . .
...
(k − 1)!Bk,1 (k − 2)!Bk,2 . . . 0!Bk,k

 ·


c1
c2
...
ck

 =


(k+1)!
0! Bk+1HY1(g
γ1)
(k+2)!
1! Bk+2HY1(g
γ2)
...
(2k)!
(k−1)!B2kHY1(g
γk)


From Lemma 12 we get that the determinant of the square matrix equals
(
∏k
i=0 i!) · (
∑k
i=0 1/i!) multiplied by (
∏k−1
i=0 i!). Since the determinant is non-
zero, the matrix is invertible and knowing HY1(g
γ1), . . . , HY1(g
γk) allows us to
find c1, . . . , ck in polynomial time using Gaussian elimination. This concludes
the proof.
L Proof of Theorem 13
Proof. The value n!SSi(g
γ) can be considered as the number of accepting paths
of nondeterministic Turing machine, so the problem is in #P. To show that
the problem is #P-hard, we use a reduction from the problem of counting all
matching in a bipartite graph which is #P-complete (Valiant, 1979).
Let G = (V,E) be an arbitrary bipartite graph with V = {v2, . . . , vk} for
notational convenience. Let hG be the number of all matchings in G (called
Hosoya index). Our goal is to determine hG.
To this end, let us construct a graph Gγ = (V ∪ {v1}, E) with l(vi) = {vi}
for vi ∈ V ∪ {v1}. Consider a complement of graph Gγ , denoted by Gγ . Since
node v1 does not have any edges in Gγ , then it is connected to all nodes in
Gγ ; hence, Gγ satisfies conditions of Lemma 4 and there exist a hybrid rule γ
equivalent to some embedded MC-nets rule such that Gγ is the corresponding
graph.
Now, consider SS1(g
γ). From Eq. (10) we know that SS1(g
γ) is a weighted
sum over clique covers, i.e., partitions of nodes inGγ into cliques. However, since
the graph is bipartite, there exist no clique with more than 2 nodes. Hence, for
every such a partition, P , we have
∏
T∈P (|T | − 1)! = 1. Thus, from Eq. (10) we
get:
SS1(g
γ) = |QC(Gγ)|/n!.
Now, it remains to observe that every partition of nodes into cliques corresponds
to exactly one matching. This concludes the proof.
M Proof of Theorem 14
Proof. From the process approach interpretation of MY-value (Skibski et al.,
2018) we get that n!MYi(g
γ) can be considered as the number of accepting
paths of nondeterministic Turing machine, so the problem is in #P. To show
that the problem is #P-hard, again we use the reduction from the problem
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of counting all matching in a bipartite graph which is #P-complete (Valiant,
1979).
With the same reasoning as in SS-value, instead of considering colorings in
graph Gγ we will focus on partitions of a graph into cliques in the complement
graph Gγ . Then, Eq. (10) can be rewritten as follows:
∆ji (g
γ)
∑
P∈QC(Gγ)
(−1)|P |(|P | − 2)!
n− |l(T )|
. (13)
Let G = (V,E) be an arbitrary bipartite graph with V = {v3, . . . , vk+2} for
notational convenience. Let hmG be the number of all matchings in G of size
k −m; note that in such a case m is the number of pairs plus the number of
unmatched nodes. We will determine hmG for every m ∈ {1, . . . , k}. The sum∑k
m=1 h
m
G is the number of all matchings in G.
To this end, let us construct k graphs: for j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, construct graph
Gγj = (V ∪ U,E) where U = {v1, v2, vk+3, . . . , vk+j+2} and l(vi) = {i} for
vi ∈ (V ∪U)\{v1} and l(v1) = {1, k+j+3, . . . , 3k+1}. Consider a complement of
graph Gγj , denoted by Gγj . Since node v1 does not have any edges in Gγj , then
it is adjacent to all nodes in Gγ ; hence, Gγj satisfies conditions from Lemma 4,
i.e., there exists hybrid rule γj equivalent to some embedded MC-nets rule such
that Gγj is the corresponding graph.
Now, consider ∆21(g
γj ). Note that j ∈ l(v2), hence T = {v2} and |l(T )| =
|{2}| = 1 . From Eq. (13) for game gγj we get that:
∆21(g
γj ) =
1
3k
k∑
m=1
(−1)m+j(m+ j)! · hmG .
This system of linear equations can be presented in the matrix form as follows:

2! −3! . . . ±(k + 1)!
−3! 4! . . . ∓(k + 2)!
...
...
. . .
...
±(k + 1)! ∓(k + 2)! . . . (2k)!

 ·


h1G
h2G
...
hkG

 =


3k ·∆21(g
γ1)
3k ·∆21(g
γ1)
...
3k ·∆21(g
γ1)


Note that by multiplying even rows and then even columns by (−1) we can
transform the square matrix into matrix A = ((i + j)!)1≤i,j≤k. Moreover, since
there are as many even rows as even columns, the determinant of the origi-
nal matrix is the same as the determinant of A. Now, from (Bacher, 2002,
Theorem 1.1) , we know that the determinant of A equals
∏k−1
i=0 (i!)(i + 2)!;
hence, the determinant of the original matrix is the same. Since the determi-
nant is non-zero, the matrix is invertible and knowing ∆21(g
γ1), . . . ,∆21(g
γk) (i.e.,
MY1(g
γ1),MY2(g
γ1), . . . ,MY1(g
γk),MY2(g
γk)) allows us to find h1G, . . . , h
k
G in
polynomial time using Gaussian elimination.
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